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We report the results of a survey of experts on “one of the most critical
problems in all of economics” (Weitzman 2001: 260) about which there has
been a great deal of disagreement: the long-term social discount rate (SDR).
The sample contains over 200 academics who are defined as experts on social
discounting by virtue of their publications. A key innovation of our survey
is that we elicit information on the fundamental determinants of the SDR,
which allows us to disentangle the main sources of disagreement. The experts’
acceptable ranges for the SDR are also elicited, which allows an examination
of whether there is any space for agreement on discounting. Our findings
lead us to the conclusion that current policy guidance on the evaluation of
long-term public projects—such as climate change mitigation and long-lived
infrastructure—requires substantial revision, in particular, a departure from
the simple, deterministic Ramsey Rule.
The appropriate SDR and the procedure for its calculation have long been
a source of disagreement among economists. Historically, economists have
found themselves either stumbling around in the “dark jungles of the second
best” in pursuit of an answer or accused of “stoking the dying embers of the
British Empire” if they claim to find one (Baumol 1968: 789; Nordhaus 2007:
691). Such disagreements resurfaced after the recommendations of the Stern
Review on the Economics of Climate Change proved to be extremely sensitive
to the choice of the SDR (Nordhaus 2007, 2008; Stern 2007). The extent
of disagreement was book-ended by Stern’s normative (prescriptive) position
which lead to a central SDR of 1.4%, and Nordhaus’ positive (descriptive)
position, which lead to a long-term SDR of 4.5%. These opposing positions
lead to radically different views on the appropriate level of climate change
mitigation.
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It is for reasons like these that discounting the distant future is viewed as
such a “critical problem”. Yet, aside from these well publicized cases, we lack
a good understanding of the extent and the sources of this disagreement. A
survey by Weitzman (2001) provided some indication of the extent of disagree-
ment by asking over 2000 economists for the appropriate “real interest rate”
for the analysis of climate change mitigation: responses ranged from -3% to
27%. Yet, the Weitzman survey was silent on the reasons for this huge varia-
tion in opinion, even on whether respondents were using positive or normative
principles to inform their response. Such information is crucial to understand-
ing the basis for SDRs and the principles that guide long-term policy analysis.
Our study is motivated by the need for more clarity on this issue.
In order to disentangle the causes of disagreement on the SDR we struc-
ture the survey around a well-known framework for inter-temporal welfare
evaluations: Time Discounted Utilitarianism and the simple Ramsey Rule.
Specifically, we elicit expert responses on two key components of the SDR:
the pure rate of time preference and the elasticity of marginal utility. In ad-
dition to these “central normative parameters” (Nordhaus 2008: 33), we ask
experts to estimate growth and the risk-free rate of interest. In this way we
obtain information on both positive and normative arguments for the SDR
(Arrow et al. 1996, 2012). These concepts are familiar to economists working
on discounting, but also have the merit of being policy relevant.1 Importantly
though, we allow sufficient flexibility for experts not to be constrained by the
simple Ramsey Rule when making their recommendations on the SDR. This
flexibility is particularly crucial as it is to be expected that experts have varied
views on how to calculate SDRs. For example, our parsimonious survey was
1A number of policy guidelines on cost-benefit analysis across the world are testament
to this (HMT 2003; IPCC 2014; Lebegue 2005).
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designed such that experts did not have to tackle the thorny issue of project
risk, by asking for a SDR with which to discount certainty-equivalent cash
flows. Yet allowing for flexibility in responses allowed macroeconomic sources
of risk and uncertainty to be factored in by experts when recommending ap-
propriate ‘risk-free’ SDRs for certainty-equivalents.
The responses make for interesting reading. The median (mean) recom-
mended SDR of our experts is 2 percent (2.3 percent). This is substantially
lower than the median (mean) values of 3 percent (4 percent) reported by
Weitzman (2001).2 We also find that there remains substantial disagreement
over this value, with individual recommendations ranging between 0 and 10
percent. Despite this, 92 percent of experts report that they would be com-
fortable with a SDR somewhere in the interval of 1 percent to 3 percent, and
over three-quarters find a SDR of 2 percent acceptable.
Looking at the empirical distributions of individual discounting determi-
nants, we find that expert opinion is particularly varied on the rate of pure
time preference. The modal value is zero, in line with many prominent opin-
ions. But with a median (mean) of 0.5 percent (1.1 percent), we cannot confirm
the IPCC’s (2014: 229) conclusion that there is“a broad consensus for a zero
or near-zero pure rate of time preference”. Also, while we find that experts
recommend placing greater weight on normative than positive issues when
determining the SDR, most believe that the SDR should be informed by both.
An unambiguous result of our survey is that the prominence of the simple
Ramsey Rule in public policy needs to be revisited. When we impute the
simple Ramsey Rule for all experts individually, we find wide discrepancies
between these values and their recommended SDRs. The rich body of qualita-
2Supplementary material A discusses differences between the two surveys.
4
tive responses provided by our experts explains the need for long-term public
decision-making to depart from the confines of this framework. Accounting for
a comprehensive set of technical issues, such as the inherent uncertainties and
changing relative prices of non-marketed goods, was one set of recommended
departures. Stressing the importance of different societal criteria, which em-
body broader notions of intergenerational equity and sustainability, was an-
other. A third set of recommendations aimed at ensuring that decision-making
is participatory and takes a more procedural approach.
Indeed, many argue for a more “democratic” approach to informing govern-
mental guidance on social discounting (e.g. Dasgupta 2008: 158). Yet, because
the questions raised by long-term cost-benefit analysis are highly complex,
there are also arguments for so-called “genuine specialists” (Pindyck 2017;
Sunstein 2014: 550) to play an active role. The opinions of experts play an
important role in public policy. Numerous expert panels held in recent years
show that social discounting is no exception.3 Precisely because discounting
policy is so often influenced by such specialists, it is imperative to obtain a
more complete picture of the range of opinions they hold. By presenting the
responses of a large number of experts on the determinants of the long-term
SDR, we contribute to the ongoing academic debate over improving approaches
to intergenerational decision-making. We also provide detailed information for
the discounting policy revisions taking place in several countries.
3Since the Stern Review, expert advice on social discounting has been sought from spe-
cialists in the field, among others, by the US Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Norwegian, French, UK, and Dutch governments (Groom and Hepburn 2017).
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I. Survey Design
A. Conceptual Background
Even a cursory glance at the literature on long-term decision-making re-
veals a multitude of conceptual approaches which could lead to different rec-
ommendations for the SDR. Some disagreement revolves around which rate of
return to capital or interest rate best describes the opportunity cost of public
investment. On the normative side, approaches such as Time Discounted Util-
itarianism (TDU) and Prioritarianism, are consequentialist. Other approaches
add procedural rules, such as sustainablility requirements, to a consequential-
ist framework (see, for example, Asheim and Mitra 2010; Chichilnisky 1996).
In each case extensions and variants abound.4
Our survey allows respondents to provide qualitative responses which could
reveal the fine-grained details of their particular perspectives on intergenera-
tional decision-making. However, the main part of the survey is structured
around TDU, as it provides a clear means of disentangling key sources of
disagreement on the SDR in terms of widely-understood concepts.
The standard TDU social welfare function, W0, takes the following form
W0 =
∫ T
t=0
exp(−δt)U (Ct) dt, (1)
where welfare at time 0 depends on all future time-separable utilities of a
representative agent whose utility depends on comprehensive real per-capita
consumption Ct. Utility is discounted at a constant rate of pure time prefer-
ence, δ, which determines how much weight is placed on future utilities from
4See for instance, Harberger and Jenkins (2015) and Spackman (2017) for recent discus-
sions on (positive) opportunity cost arguments, and Asheim (2010), Botzen and van den
Bergh (2014) and Fleurbaey and Zuber (2015) for overviews of alternative normative criteria
for long-term decision-making.
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today’s perspective. A frequently-used simplifying assumption is that utility
is isoelastic: U (Ct) = (1 − η)−1(C1−ηt − 1) if η 6= 1 and U (Ct) = ln(Ct) if
η = 1. Here, η is the constant elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,
which reflects how averse society is to the differences in consumption that arise
over time due to growth.5
The TDU framework thus captures some key features of the inter-temporal
trade-offs that society faces and can lead to a simple social discounting rule
known as the Ramsey Rule (Ramsey 1928):
r = δ + η g, (2)
where r is the risk-free return to capital, and g is the real, per-capita,
growth rate of consumption. This optimality condition equates the returns
to saving/investment in risk-free capital on the production side (r) with the
welfare-preserving inter-temporal trade-off on the consumption side (δ + η g).
The latter is the exact solution to the first order condition of the optimal
consumption problem with a constant growth rate, g = gt = t
−1 ln(ct/c0).
Although speaking to optimal saving, the Ramsey Rule also provides a the-
oretical foundation within TDU for determining the SDR in the absence of
uncertainty (Arrow et al. 2012).
Disagreement on long-term discounting often focuses on the two key wel-
fare parameters, δ and η, and their normative-positive content. There is also
disagreement about the role of r in social discounting (Arrow et al. 1996;
Nordhaus 2007). Two main interpretations of this rule in this context are in
common use. First, the opportunity cost of capital approach focuses on the
trajectory of the risk-free capital stock, and its rate of return r:
5This parameter may also reflect aversion to differences that occur in different states of
the world, and so under uncertainty η can also be interpreted as a measure of risk aversion.
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SDR = r, (3)
which anchors the SDR to the yield on relatively risk-free assets, e.g. gov-
ernment bonds. This approach relates to the ‘positive’ approach to social
discounting followed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA
2010), among others.
The second approach concerns the trajectory of consumption and asks how
to optimally distribute the returns of a marginal project over time. In a de-
terministic world this consumption-side approach leads to the simple Ramsey
Rule (SRR):
SDR = SRR = δ + η g, (4)
leading to two reasons why society might discount the future: the rate of
societal pure time preference, δ; and a ‘wealth effect’, η × g, which captures
the idea that society may place less weight on future net benefits if the future is
more wealthy. The SRR is typically considered to be the ‘normative’ approach,
and is the interpretation followed by Her Majesty’s Treasury in the UK (HMT
2003) and the German Environmental Agency (UBA 2012), for instance.
While the deterministic structure is helpful to organize ideas on social
discounting and to pin down some main sources of disagreement within a
parsimoniously structured survey, it is clear that long-term public decision-
making has to deal with uncertainty. At the very least, two types of uncertainty
matter: one that relates to the growth rate of consumption and another that
relates to the payoffs from the marginal project itself. For example, if growth in
each year is independently and identically Normally distributed, an extended
consumption-side Ramsey Rule (ERR) emerges:
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SDR = ERR = δ + η g¯ − 0.5 η (η + 1)σ2, (5)
with g¯ = µ + 0.5σ2, where µ is the mean of real, per-capita logarithmic
consumption growth and σ2 is its variance (Gollier 2012). Uncertainty in
growth reduces the risk-free SDR for a prudent social planner for precautionary
reasons, with the precautionary effect given by −0.5 η (η + 1)σ2.6
While the ERR captures the basic idea of the precautionary effect, equation
(5) is based upon a rather limited expression of growth uncertainty. Stronger
precautionary effects could emerge if it is expected that large, non-marginal
and possibly persistent shifts in growth are possible, such as would be experi-
enced in a major depression. Barro (2006) models a growth process with the
prospect of such events and illustrates the reduction in the risk-free rate that
this would entail.7 In the long-term context in which our survey takes place,
growth processes like this could play an important part in determining the
appropriate risk-free SDR, and may underpin responses from our experts.
Another important element of uncertainty is project specific risk: the risk
associated with the project benefits. Because the focus of this study is purely
on the components of the risk-free SDR, it is important that the survey is able
to abstract from project specific risks so that the risk-free elements of the SDR
can be isolated. For instance, in finance it would be typical to deploy a project
specific discount rate. This would contain a positive (negative) risk premium
6A planner is prudent if the third derivative of the utility function is positive. According
to Gollier (2012: Table 3.3), the global average precautionary effect amounts to -1 percent.
7Gollier (2012: 75-76) provides a simple example of the point made by Barro (2006). If
λ represents the growth shock as an instantaneous percentage loss of GDP, which happens
with a probability p, and growth otherwise (with probability 1 − p) follows a Brownian
motion, the appropriate risk-free SDR becomes:
SDR = δ − ln[p(1− λ)−η + (1− p) exp(−ηg¯ + 0.5η2σ2)], (6)
which is lower than the ERR for positive values of λ, and decreasing in λ.
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on top of the risk-free rate to reflect a positive (negative) correlation of the
project payoffs with the returns from a market portfolio. The Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) model provides a central theoretical foundation for this
approach. In the context of the Ramsey framework, the consumption-based
CAPM model recommends a similar adjustment, except that the risk premium
would now reflect the correlation of the project’s benefits with consumption
growth in the macroeconomy. A survey which could elicit project specific
risk premiums would require an extensive array of questions on different types
of projects. Yet our concern is with the risk-free SDR, which is a common
element of the SDR for the appraisal of all projects.8
In order to focus on disagreement regarding key elements of the risk-free
SDR, we frame the survey around certainty-equivalent values. This isolates
the risk-free SDR because costs and benefits that are presented in certainty-
equivalent terms should be discounted at a risk-free rate.9 Using certainty
equivalence facilitates a parsimonious survey which elicits elements of the
risk-free rate without drawing out the additional complexities raised when
estimating project-specific discount rate risk-premia.10
Beyond the question of uncertainty, a number of other extensions are
8In the Discussion section, we further explain that the risk-free component of the SDR
is a crucial component even when discounting expected cash-flows at a risk-adjusted rate.
9Additional motivation for this approach comes from Zeckhauser and Viscusi (2009:
96), who argue that “economists generally agree that whoever is the decision maker, the
discount rate should not be adjusted for risk. The preferred approach, roughly speaking,
is to address risk by converting monetary payoffs to certainty-equivalents, and then do the
discounting.” While not all economists would agree with this statement, and while most
financial economists would deal with project risk through an adjustment to the discount rate
as discussed previously, almost all are familiar with this basis for dealing with uncertainty.
10We do not address the question of how to estimate certainty-equivalents, which is con-
sidered by many scholars and practitioners to be a highly challenging exercise. Bansal
et al. (2016), Lemoine (2017) and Weitzman (2009) are examples of a growing literature
discussing the problem of certainty equivalence in the area of climate change, where uncer-
tainties abound.
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possible—such as accounting for the changing relative prices of non-market
goods (Gollier 2010; Traeger 2011) or declining discount rates (Arrow et al.
2013)—as well as alternative approaches outside of Time Discounted Utili-
tarianism. Importantly, by eliciting the SDR separately from the individual
components of the simple Ramsey Rule, and by including the option for quali-
tative responses, the survey does not force experts into the Procrustean bed of
the simple Ramsey Rule. Flexibility in the way in which experts could respond
allows for many different possible rationales to be expressed.
B. The Survey Questions
The survey asked respondents about the SDR and some of its fundamental
determinants.11 The questionnaire began with the following contextual pream-
ble, followed by seven brief quantitative questions and an optional comments
section for qualitative responses:
Imagine that you are asked for advice by an international govern-
mental organization that needs to determine the appropriate real
social discount rate for calculating the present value of certainty-
equivalent cash flows of public projects with intergenerational con-
sequences.
For its calculations, the organization needs single values for the
components of the real social discount rate. While this does not
capture all of the important complexities of social discounting, it
does reflect most existing policy guidance on the matter. Your an-
swers will therefore help to improve the current state of decision-
making for public investments.
11We piloted different versions of the survey with selected experts, economists from dif-
ferent fields, and students to find the best trade-off between completeness and parsimony.
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Specifically, you are asked to provide your recommendations on the
single number, global average and long-term (>100 years) values
of the following determinants of the social discount rate:
1. Growth rate of real per-capita consumption [X% per year].
2. Rate of societal pure time preference (or utility discount rate) [X%].
3. Elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption [X].
4. Real risk-free interest rate [X% per year]. Remember that this should be
a global average and long-term forecast.
5. What relative weight (summing up to 100%) should the governmental
body place on the following rationales for determining the social discount
rate:
(a) Normative issues, involving justice towards future generations [X%],
and
(b) Descriptive issues, involving forecasted average future returns to fi-
nancial assets [X%]?
6. What is your recommended real social discount rate for evaluating the
certainty-equivalent cash flows of a global public project with intergener-
ational consequences [X% per year]?
7. What minimum and maximum real social discount rate would you be
comfortable with recommending [X% to X percent per year]?
8. Do you have any additional comments [X]?
Questions 1–2 elicited responses on the two key normative parameters δ
and η. Questions 3-4 asked for forecasts of the long-term global average growth
rate of real per-capita consumption, g, and real interest rate, r. Question 6
asked for the point-value of the SDR that should be recommended for eval-
uating the certainty-equivalent cash flows of a generic global public project
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with intergenerational consequences. The open comments section, Question
8, allowed for feedback on the survey, where respondents could, and often did,
point towards various deviations from the simple Ramsey rule.
Question 5 elicited information about each respondent’s approach to dis-
counting by asking for the relative weight that the governmental body should
place on normative versus positive approaches to determining the SDR. Re-
sponses were measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 percent. This explores
the disagreement in rationales that has been evident at least since Arrow et
al. (1996): whether normative issues, involving intergenerational ethics and
justice, or positive issues, involving forecasted future returns to financial as-
sets, or a mixture of both should determine the SDR. Importantly, the sliding
scale admits many interpretations of normative and positive other than those
associated with the Ramsey Rule. For instance, responses could reflect the
relative weight that respondents place on different consequentialist or deonto-
logical ethical frameworks. Finally, in Question 7 we asked for the minimum
and maximum values of the SDR that respondents would be comfortable with
recommending, in order to elicit an ‘agreeable range’.
C. Expert Selection and Survey Dissemination
Because our survey aimed at disentangling the determinants of the long-
term SDR, we restricted our sample to scholars who have been involved with
these complex issues. For the purposes of this paper, an individual is deemed
to be a potential ‘expert’ if he or she is a (co-)author of at least one pertinent
publication in the field of (social) discounting in a leading economics journal.
A journal was classified as ‘leading’ if, according to the ranking of 600 eco-
nomics journals by Combes and Linnenmer (2010, Table 15), it is rated A
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or higher, together with the topical Review of Environmental Economics and
Policy. This amounts to 103 peer-reviewed journals. A publication is deemed
to be ‘pertinent’ if it was published between January 2000 and March 2014
and, according to the Google Scholar engine, included at least one of the terms
‘social discounting’, ‘social discount rate’ or ‘social discount factor’.12 Correct-
ing for scholars with multiple publications, and discarding papers that did not
pass a weak relevancy test, our sample includes 627 potential experts.13
There are a number of limitations to this selection strategy. First, by re-
stricting the search to publications since the year 2000 to only capture schol-
ars active in the current debate on social discounting, we potentially miss
some relevant earlier contributors. Second, by selecting experts based on their
publications, we necessarily include co-authors of relevant papers who are not
themselves experts on discounting. Third, due to the rather generous weak rel-
evancy test, we include a number of scholars who might not regard themselves
as true experts on the issue. Fourth, we do not pick up relevant publications
in the field that have used other terms to discuss discounting. Finally, we miss
potentially relevant articles in lower-ranked journals.14 This may introduce a
geographical bias into our sample by under-representing those from develop-
ing nations. Despite these possible short-comings, the definition of expert that
we deploy here is close to the one frequently used by policy makers, both in
general policy contexts and in relation to social discounting.
12To obtain a broader set of potential experts, we further performed a search based on
abstracts for the term ‘discount rate’ within the same journals in EconLit. Using EconLit
allowed restricting the search to more relevant papers that already discussed discounting in
the abstract (a general Google Scholar search for the term ‘discount rate’ yields more than
300 000 hits, containing a large number of irrelevant papers that would need to be manually
evaluated). Of the 627 potential experts, 219 were obtained through the EconLit search.
13See Supplementary material B for further details on the selection procedure.
14A citation threshold would be an alternative quality signal (see, e.g., Pindyck 2016).
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Starting in May 2014, we sent out a link to the online survey (implemented
in SurveyMonkey) via e-mail to all potential experts, and used three general
rounds of reminders, each time slightly varying the subject line and motivation
for answering the survey.15 In later rounds, we offered the option of completing
the survey in a Word document or in the e-mail itself to increase flexibility.
II. Survey Results
Table 1 provides summary statistics for expert responses. By November
2014 we had received responses from 197 experts, including 12 who solely
provided qualitative feedback containing important insights. We also received
replies from 27 scholars explaining why they did not answer the survey, without
warranting inclusion as qualitative responses.16 Responses were also obtained
after the survey closed from 38 previous non-respondents. This group is used
to check for non-response bias. Following several standard procedures to test
for non-response bias, we find no systematic unidirectional biases for SDR
recommendations (see Appendix A.).
Overall, we elicited 262 responses out of a pool of 627 potential experts.
The response rate is 30 percent if we only consider the 185 quantitative re-
sponses. If we include all responses, the rate rises to 42 percent. Each is in
line with comparable online surveys with economists (Necker 2014). Besides
this, the sampling strategy was successful in obtaining responses from ‘blue
ribbon’ academic leaders on social discounting, including 12 of the 13 experts
of the Arrow et al. (2012) panel who advised the US EPA on this matter.
15Supplementary material C provides the initial e-mail text.
16The most common reason for non-response was self-reported insufficient expertise, but
it also included not having enough time or being unable to respond due to reasons of central
bank confidentiality.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Survey Results
Variable Mean StdD Median Mode Min Max N
Real growth rate per capita 1.70 0.91 1.60 2.00 -2.00 5.00 181
Rate of societal pure time 1.10 1.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 8.00 180
preference
Elasticity of marginal utility 1.35 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.00 5.00 173
Real risk-free interest rate 2.38 1.32 2.00 2.00 0.00 6.00 176
Normative weight 61.53 28.56 70 50 0 100 182
Positive weight 38.47 28.56 30 50 0 100 182
Social discount rate (SDR) 2.27 1.62 2.00 2.00 0.00 10.00 181
SDR lower bound 1.12 1.37 1.00 0.00 -3.00 8.00 182
SDR upper bound 4.14 2.80 3.50 3.00 0.00 20.00 183
Quantitative responses 185
Qualitative responses 100
Responses used for analysis 197
Explained non-responses 27
Bias-check responses 38
Total number of responses 262
Note: “StdD” refers to standard deviation and “Min” (“Max”) to minimum (maximum) recommendation.
A. Quantitative Responses
A.1 Recommended Long-Term Social Discount Rate
In recent years, prominent experts such as Gollier (2012), Nordhaus (2008),
Stern (2007) and Weitzman (2007) have proposed very different SDRs. Fig-
ure 1 (a) illustrates the extent of disagreement on the SDR for discounting real
certainty-equivalent cash flows of a global public project with intergenerational
consequences. The lowest recommendation is 0 and the highest 10 percent.
However, the vast majority of experts provide point recommendations in the
range of 0 to 4 percent, while the interval of 1 to 3 percent contains the point
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SDR recommendations of 68 percent of experts. The mean (median) value
of the recommended SDR are 2.27 percent (2 percent), which are much lower
than the corresponding values from Weitzman’s (2001) survey of economists
of 3.96 percent (3 percent). Yet the most common single value recommended
in these two different surveys is 2 percent. These results deviate substantially
from the discount rates recommended in important recent guidelines, including
the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014: 230).
A.2 Rate of Societal Pure Time Preference
Positions on the rate of societal pure time preference, δ, have historically
been the subject of intense disagreement. Luminaries of economics, such as
Pigou, Ramsey and Harrod, believed that the well-being of each generation
ought to be weighted equally, and so pure time preference should be zero. This
view stems from their classical impartial Utilitarian philosophy. Disagreement
surfaced again more recently with the publication of the Stern Review (Stern
2007), which took a similar stance. Many alternative arguments exist for the
use of a positive rate of societal pure time preference (e.g. Arrow 1999; Koop-
mans 1960; Nordhaus 2007). Figure 1 (b) shows substantial disagreement
among experts on their chosen value for this parameter. As the modal value,
0 percent is a focal point, and, if we include those responses that lie in the
range of 0 to 0.1 percent, 38 percent take what might be called the Ramsey-
Stern view. Yet, the distribution of responses is substantially right-skewed
with a median of 0.50 percent, a mean of 1.10 percent and a maximum recom-
mendation of 8 percent. Based on these results, we cannot confirm the IPCC’s
(2014: 229) conclusion that “a broad consensus for a zero or near-zero pure
rate of time preference” exists among experts.
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Figure 1: This figure provides histograms of expert recommendations and forecasts on
discounting determinants. Figure (a) shows the real long-term SDR (in percent), (b) rate of
societal pure time preference (in percent), (c) elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,
(d) real growth rate of per capita consumption (in percent), (e) real risk-free interest rate
(in percent), and (f) the normative weight for determining the SDR (in percent).
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A.3 Elasticity of the Marginal Utility of Consumption
Settling on a value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption,
η, is an intricate affair. The reason is that it might capture vastly different
concepts and thus lend itself to different interpretations. These are not only
divided along the lines of normative (e.g., issues of distribution) and posi-
tive (e.g., preferences for consumption smoothing) determinants, but might
also capture the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution or so-
cietal preferences for the aversion of consumption inequalities across space,
time and also states of nature. All these rationales could have been used by
different experts to inform their response, although the survey setting might
reasonably have led respondents to primarily consider interpretations relating
to an intertemporal consumption smoothing or inequality context, as opposed
to representing aversion to risk. Previous discussions in the literature point
towards a range of 0.5 to 4 (Cowell and Gardiner 1999; Dasgupta 2008), al-
though Groom and Maddison (2017) argue strongly for a narrower range of
between 1.5 and 2 for the UK based on revealed preference approaches. The
resulting expert recommendations for the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption as presented in Figure 1 (c) are indeed widely dispersed, with a
mean of 1.35 and a median and mode of 1. These values provide some support
to the often made assumption of logarithmic utility.
A.4 Growth Rate of Real Per-Capita Consumption
Figure 1 (d) presents the results of our respondents’ forecasts of the growth
rate of real per-capita consumption, g. The overwhelming majority forecast a
positive growth rate, with a mean of 1.7 percent and a median of 1.6 percent
(cf. Table 1). This is close to the 2 percent growth rate of consumption per-
capita in the western world for the last two centuries (Gollier 2012) and the 1.6
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percent growth rate in GDP per-capita over the period 1900 to 2000 in non-
OECD countries (Boltho and Toniolo 1999). Three experts project a negative
growth rate, and 55 respondents forecast a lower growth rate than the IPCC’s
(2000) lower bound projection of 1.3 percent for the period from 1990 to 2100.
28 experts forecast a growth rate larger than 2 percent.
A.5 Real Risk-Free Interest Rate
The mean long-run real risk-free rate of interest among our respondents
was 2.38 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.32 percentage points and a
median value of 2 percent.17 The mean response was higher than the observed
real rate of return on relatively risk-free assets in many countries at the time
of the survey. There are several possible reasons for this apparent discrepancy.
The assets typically (although loosely) described as ‘risk-free’ are Govern-
ment bills and bonds, but neither quite meets the theoretical ideal for long-
term social discounting.18 In practice, social discounting policy has tended to
regard bonds as the appropriate relatively risk-free asset to benchmark, due
to their longer time horizon (see, e.g., Stern 2008; OMB 2016; US EPA 2010).
When estimating the schedule of declining discount rates within a positivist
framework, researchers have also used bond yields (Newell and Pizer 2003;
Groom et al. 2007; Freeman et al. 2015). Within the practice of corporate
17While our question explicitly asked for a forecast of a risk-free interest rate, we cannot
exclude the possibility that some respondents were instead providing a forecast return on
production, or even equity, capital. Such returns include the premium associated with in-
vesting in risky assets and therefore are not appropriate for discounting certainty-equivalent
cash-flows. This may lead to an upward bias in the sample responses.
18Bills are virtually risk-free, but their maturity is too short to be relevant for long-term
social discounting. Also, while a rolling portfolio of bills can match the maturity of a long-
term cost or benefit, we cannot currently observe what rate of return this portfolio will
actually provide. Bonds, on the other hand, are long-maturity, but their real realized return
is affected by uncertain future inflation. Their yields therefore incorporate an inflation risk
premium, meaning they are not strictly ‘risk-free’.
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finance, there is also a strong preference for using Treasury bond yields as a
proxy for the risk-free rate in capital budgeting (Bancel and Mittoo 2014).19
Over the period 1900-2016 (since 2000), the global average real return was
approximately 0.8 (-0.5) percent for bills and 1.8 (4.8) percent for bonds (Dim-
son et al. 2017: 10). The mean response of 2.38 percent is therefore not too
dissimilar to the mean global bond rates witnessed since 1900.20 Furthermore,
when predicting long-run global rates it is likely that experts were considering
different scenarios for the 21st Century, in which the growing economies of
Asia, Africa and Latin America have higher rates of return, and hence change
the composition of global interest rates.
A.6 Normative versus Positive Approaches
A central point of disagreement on the SDR concerns the question of
whether normative issues, involving justice towards future generations, or
positive issues, involving forecast average future risk-free rates, or a mix of
the two should determine the SDR (Arrow et al. 1996, 2014). Not everyone
agrees that Time Discounted Utilitarianism is the correct ethical basis for in-
tergenerational decision-making in the first place. For instance, some prefer
deontological ethics which emphasise duties, while others prefer rights-based
approaches. In line with this history of disagreement on the SDR, our inten-
tion for Question 5 is to establish the extent to which recommendations on
the SDR are influenced by “positive predictions and ethical judgments” (Rick-
etts and Shoesmith 1992: 210–211). A clear finding from our data is that a
19Freeman (2009) also argues that the theoretical case is stronger for using bonds over
bills in this context.
20Consider also the lower bound SDR recommended by the US-OMB (2003) for calculating
the Social Cost of Carbon based on relatively risk-free savings rates. Greenstone et al. (2013)
state: “Moreover, 3 percent (real) roughly corresponds to the after-tax riskless interest rate”.
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large majority of experts (80 percent) think that both dimensions are relevant
(see Figure 1 (f)). However, they generally recommend that governmental in-
stitutions should place greater weight on normative issues in determining the
SDR; this has a mean (median) weighting of 61.53 percent (70 percent). When
considering extremes, 14 percent (5 percent) of experts placed 0 (100 percent)
weight on positive considerations, while 42 experts were divided equally be-
tween the two rationales; making this the modal response. These findings
underscore that setting the SDR requires both forecasts and value judgments.
B. Qualitative Responses
More than half of our respondents provided comments ranging from short
remarks, such as “risk matters”, to explanations over multiple pages. The
qualitative observations provide a rich body of evidence which sheds light on
various complexities of the theory and practice of social discounting. We group
these comments into four main categories that address (i) individual survey
questions Q1-Q5, (ii) technical issues, (iii) methodological issues, and (iv)
concerns about limited expertise. Each category has multiple subcategories.
Table B.1 in Appendix B. provides an overview of the most common issues
raised, including the number of experts commenting on it and an exemplary
quote, sometimes edited for brevity. The five most often raised subcategories
are: ‘declining discount rates and time-horizon’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘substitutability
and environmental scarcity’, ‘heterogeneity and aggregation’, and ‘comparison
to the Ramsey Rule’.
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III. Analysis
A. Determinants of the SDR
We now examine the relationship between experts’ recommended SDRs
and its fundamental determinants.21 In line with what one would expect from
the Ramsey framework, the correlations between the rate of pure time prefer-
ence, δ, as well as the ‘wealth effect’, η×g, and expert’s SDR recommendation
are positive. More precisely, a univariate increase in δ of one percentage point
increases the SDR recommendation by 0.34 percentage points (p < 0.01).22
The effect of an increase in η × g by one percentage point increases the SDR
by 0.15 percentage points (p < 0.01).23 The main driver of the wealth ef-
fect is the forecasted growth rate, while η is not significantly associated with
higher SDR recommendations in isolation. An increase in r by one percent-
age point is associated with an increase of the SDR by 0.52 percentage points
(p < 0.01). A very robust and sizable determinant of the SDR is the weight
that experts would put on normative as compared to positive issues (‘norma-
tive weight’) when forming their SDR recommendation. We find that each
additional percentage-point of the relative weight put on normative issues re-
duces the SDR by 0.02 percentage points (p < 0.01). This implies that a pure
‘positivist’ (normative scale = 0) would recommend a SDR that is 2 percentage
points higher than a pure ‘normativist’ (normative scale = 100 percent).
We further examine how other considerations expressed through experts’
qualitative comments may determine SDR recommendations. For this, we
build on the categorization of qualitative comments as shown in Table B.1
21Further analysis is presented in a previous working paper version (Drupp et al. 2015).
22All test are based on two-sided t-tests.
23When evaluated multivariatelty the partial effects are 0.32 and 0.11 (both p < 0.01).
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and analyze the relation of the SDR to the three most-mentioned categories.
Experts commenting on declining discount rates recommend an SDR that is
0.70 percentage points lower (p < 0.05), consistent with arguments provided in
the pertinent literature.24 Furthermore, experts commenting on uncertainty
recommend an SDR which is 0.69 percentage points lower (p < 0.01), also
consistent with the view that prudence in the face of uncertainty tends to
lower the appropriate SDR.25 For those experts commenting on environmental
scarcity and relative price effects, we find SDR values that are lower by 0.97
percentage points (p < 0.01). Again, this is consistent with the literature on
dual discounting and the relative price changes of non-market goods.26
While our survey was only designed to capture select fundamental deter-
minants of the SDR for reasons of parsimony, and as the qualitative comments
of repondents do not paint a complete picture, it is clear that we only cap-
ture some of the determinants of the SDR.27 Overall, however, this analysis
suggests that responses appear to be theoretically motivated.
24See, e.g., Arrow et al. (2013), Cropper et al. (2014), Gollier et al. (2008), Groom et al.
(2005), Newell and Pizer (2003), Weitzman (2001).
25See, e.g., Gollier (2008), Traeger (2009), Weitzman (1998), Weitzman and Gollier (2010).
26See, e.g., Baumga¨rtner et al. (2015), Drupp (2016), Drupp and Ha¨nsel (2018), Gollier
(2010), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Sterner and Persson (2008), Traeger (2011).
27For example, it seems likely that contained within our normative-positive measure is
a variety of unexplained and unobserved normative positions. Variation could also reflect
differences within the positive school stemming from, for instance, differences or asymmetries
in the information used to provide a global forecast.
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B. Experts’ SDRs and the Ramsey Rule framework
An important issue for governmental guidance on social discounting is to
consider which theoretical framework may form the basis of recommendations
on the SDR. The previous analysis of discounting determinants has revealed
that experts’ SDR responses are indeed informed by some of its fundamen-
tal determinants in a way that would be based on theories discussed in Sec-
tion I. A. We now scrutinize whether and to what extent experts’ SDR rec-
ommendations may be in line with the simple Ramsey Rule (SRR) or the
extended Ramsey Rule (ERR) that feature prominently in policy guidelines.
We first impute the SRR using responses on individual components from
each expert. We find that its median (mean) [modal] value is 3 (3.48) [4]
percent. The mean SRR is thus 1.21 percentage points higher than the mean
SDR. Figure 2 displays a histogram of the differences between individual SDRs
and imputed SRRs, excluding five outliers. The SDR coincides with the SRR
for only 36 respondents.28 This strongly suggests that the simple, deterministic
Ramsey Rule is not the preferred model for determining the SDR for the
majority of experts. Indeed, the qualitative responses of many experts reveal
well-motivated reasons for departing from this framework. We now explore
potential reasons for the large heterogeneity in differences between the SDR
and the SRR depicted in Figure 2.
One prominent alternative to the SRR that many experts might have re-
lied upon is the more general ERR. Indeed, a number of respondents explic-
itly stated that they considered uncertainty in the economy’s baseline growth
when forming their SDR recommendation.29 In the extended Ramsey Rule,
28It is important to note that the fact that these responses are equal does not necessarily
imply that experts based their SDR response on the SRR.
29For example, an expert stated: “my discount rate is less than implied by the Ramsey
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Figure 2: Histogram of the difference between the recommended SDR and the
imputed simple Ramsey Rule (SRR = δ + η × g), in the interval [-5.5, 5.5].
a precautionary savings motive results in ERR−SRR = −0.5η (η + 1)σ2 ≤ 0,
where σ2 is the volatility of real per-capita consumption growth (Gollier 2002,
2011).30 If respondents use the ERR for determining their SDR, we would
expect that SDR < SRR. This seems to be the case for most respondents (see
Figure 2). While we do not elicit forecasts of σ, we can indirectly infer the
value of this parameter that would make the ERR consistent with the SDR for
any given expert. We can reconcile the SDR of only seven respondents with
the ERR if their applied estimate of σ ∈ (0%, 3.6%]. This is the value of σ
used by Gollier (2012: Table 3.1). Allowing σ ∈ (0%, 9%], the SDR response
of 41 experts can be reconciled with the ERR. The mean (median) value of σ
that would ensure consistency between the SDR and ERR response for the 97
experts for whom SDR<SRR is 11 percent (10 percent), which is considerably
higher than standard estimates for this parameter value (Gollier 2011). This
implies that even though a number of experts may have relied on the ERR,
rule because I use the extended rule, incorporating uncertainty about long term growth”.
30Note that the interpretation of η here may differ from that of our survey, as the survey
does not explicitly focus on risk aversion and prudence.
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the precautionary savings motive in this framework is unlikely to have been
the only determinant driving lower SDRs.
Yet, experts may have factored in more severe forms of uncertainty, such as
jump-risks in the spirit of Barro (2006), or considered other issues that drive
a wedge between the recommended SDRs and imputed SRRs. Indeed, a range
of arguments have been provided by experts for lower SDRs. Among others,
these point towards the use of declining discount rates or the consideration of
changes in the relative price of non-marketed environmental goods.
Figure 2 also shows a number of experts recommended SDRs that are
higher than the imputed SRR and thus cannot be reconciled by precautionary
savings. Such positions were often motivated by arguments relating to the
opportunity cost of governmental funds, indicating the need to evaluate in-
tergenerational projects using the opportunity cost of capital, rather than the
SRR or ERR, together with the idea that the former will typically be higher.
Beyond these technical arguments, further criticism focused on the need for
alternative approaches to inform intergenerational decision-making.31
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that within the expert community there
are several distinct schools of thought on how to discount intergenerational
projects, which are more nuanced than the standard normative-positive di-
chotomy. In particular, our analysis reveals quantitatively and qualitatively
that many experts are skeptical about the central role of the simple Ramsey
Rule in determining policy recommendations on long-term public projects.
31Experts recorded doubts about whether “a representative agent model with a standard
Ramsey social welfare function is adequate in either descriptive or normative terms”. They
also point towards “richer ways of framing questions of intergenerational justice than simply
tweaking the discount rate” by developing alternative criteria for intergenerational decision-
making. Such approaches might “set limits in physical terms to the future development that
must not be exceeded for reasons of intra- and intergenerational justice [...]. Then use a
discounted utilitarian approach to optimise development only within these limits”.
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Figure 3: Figure (a) depicts the minimum and maximum SDR values that
individual experts are still comfortable with recommending. The x-axis in
Figure (b) shows the lower bound of an interval of given size (e.g. 2 percent)
and the y-axis the proportion of experts whose acceptable SDR range has some
overlap with an interval of a particular size starting at that point.
C. Disagreement on Social Discount Rates
Point recommendations on the SDR range from 0 to 10 percent. It is
therefore unsurprising that the minimum acceptable SDRs reported by some
experts are above the maximum acceptable SDRs of others (Figure 3 (a)).
Yet, a closer inspection of the experts’ acceptable ranges shows that there is
considerable space for agreement on the SDR.
The colored histogram in Figure 3 (b) shows the proportion of experts
whose acceptable SDR range includes any given SDR value. From this colored
histogram we can also conclude that, besides being the median and modal
point SDR recommendation (cf. Table 1), a SDR of 2 percent is also contained
in the acceptable range of more experts than any other value (77 percent). The
transparent histogram shows, for any given SDR value, x, the proportion of
experts whose acceptable SDR range overlaps the interval [x, x+2%]. Looking
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at x = 1% on this histogram reveals that the interval [1%, 3%] is overlapped
by the acceptable range of the SDR for 92 percent of experts.
These data on SDR ranges shed light on which of the prominent positions
voiced in the academic and public debate—the long-term SDR of 4.5 percent
in Nordhaus (2008), or Stern’s (2007) central SDR value of 1.4 percent—
is more representative of the expert community. Based on the point SDR
recommendations, we find that while 30 percent of experts recommend Stern’s
SDR of 1.4 percent or lower, only 9 percent of experts recommend Nordhaus’
value of 4.5 percent or higher, with 61 percent forming the middle ground
between these two. The SDRs employed by Nordhaus (2008) and Stern (2007)
are included in the acceptable range of 31 percent and 58 percent of experts,
respectively. While there is more support for Stern’s position, our findings
suggest that neither may be deemed robust enough by policy-makers, who
might prefer instead to take a position between the two.
IV. Discussion
In this section we discuss advice on determining an appropriate SDR for
long-term policy making from the survey evidence. Three immediate questions
arise. First, what role should experts play in providing the raw materials for
the SDR? Second, how should heterogeneities in expert views be treated when
calculating the appropriate SDR? Third, what does this survey tell us about
how to discount risky projects?
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A. The Role of Experts
The role of experts in public policy has itself been a source of disagree-
ment (Dasgupta 2008; Weitzman 2001). One typical criticism is that guidance
on social discounting should be informed via more “democratic” means (Das-
gupta 2008: 158). It is often claimed that economists do not command any
special expertise in matters of ethics. Yet some discussants explicitly advo-
cate an active role for “genuine specialists” to steer the process of setting SDRs
(Pindyck 2017; Sunstein 2014: 550). This comes as no surprise, as the ques-
tions raised by intergenerational discounting are highly complex. Compared
to members of the general population, experts will have spent considerably
more time considering the intricate issues that arise. We also note that gov-
ernmental guidance on social discounting is generally influenced by expert
opinion, as are other areas of policy as evidenced by, for example, member-
ship of Monetary Policy Committees. There is also a distinction to be drawn
within economics between genuine specialists and general economists. Mone-
tary Policy Committee members typically fall into the former category, as do
those who have provided recent advice to international governments on social
discounting. Therefore, while there are good arguments for more inclusive
approaches, it is also imperative that advice is heard from genuine experts on
the determinants of the long-term SDR. It is thus also crucial to obtain a more
representative account of expert opinions, such as we provide in this paper.
B. Dealing with Heterogeneity
Based on the heterogeneous responses to this survey, a decision-maker
might reasonably ask which single rate to use when discounting the certainty-
equivalent cash flows from an intergenerational project. Deciding how best to
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adjudicate between conflicting opinions, and aggregate different forecasts, is a
contentious issue to which there is no single accepted answer.32 Given the lack
of clear theoretical guidance on how to aggregate individual expert responses,
what remains may be to rely on a data-driven approach. Fortunately, this
points towards a rather clear recommendation: a long term SDR of 2 percent
is not only the modal and median recommendation but also the SDR value that
is included in the acceptable ranges of most experts (77 percent). Interestingly,
this long-run SDR of 2 percent is lower than the equivalent recommendations
of the UK, French and US governments.
C. Discounting Expected Cash Flows
The exercise that we have undertaken here has been framed around cer-
tainty equivalence. For this reason, the recommended SDRs discussed are risk-
free rates, appropriate for calculating present values for risk-free or certainty-
equivalent costs and benefits. However, in most circumstances, governments
use expected cash-flows directly as if they were already certainty-equivalent
values.33 The problem then is that if there are project-specific risks, and these
are correlated with consumption risk, then public projects may contribute to,
32One proposal is to calculate the discount factor for each respondent, and then construct
the social discount factor as a weighted average of individual discount factors. This is the
approach taken by Weitzman (2001) and leads to a declining term structure of SDRs. The
difficulty with this approach is that it is not clear what weights to assign to each of the
expert discount factors. While Weitzman (2001) gives each response equal importance, this
has been a controversial choice (Freeman and Groom 2015; Heal and Millner 2014; Jouini et
al. 2010; Millner and Heal 2017; Weitzman and Gollier 2010; Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005).
In particular, Freeman and Groom (2015) show that the appropriate weighting depends on
whether responses reflect disagreement on value judgments or uncertainty about forecasts.
33This approach has in part been motivated by the Arrow-Lind theorem (Arrow and
Lind 1970), which has had considerable influence in policy circles. However, the Arrow-
Lind theorem has been subject to increased scrutiny in recent years. Lucas (2014) and
Baumstark and Gollier (2014) argue that it is unlikely to hold.
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or diminish, macroeconomic risk. The appropriate SDR for evaluating the net
benefits in such cases should then vary from one project to another depending
on their risk profiles. The SDR for a climate change mitigation project, for
example, is likely to differ vastly from that appropriate for health, transport
and education projects if the social planner is using expected, not certainty-
equivalent, benefits. Any given project should be penalized (rewarded) using
a specific risk adjustment depending on whether it increases (reduces) macroe-
conomic risk (e.g. Gollier 2012: 193). For instance, consider a project j with
a project consumption beta, βj.
34 The consumption-based CAPM model esti-
mates the SDR for project j as the risk-adjusted discount rate:
SDRj = SDR + pi(βj), (7)
where the last term, pi(βj), represents the risk premium.
35 From equation (7)
it is clear that all projects require information on the risk-free discount rate
even in this expected cash flow setting, and this has been the focus of this
paper. Estimating the risk premiums associated with long-term projects is a
tricky issue about which there is little general agreement.36 Further research
is required to elicit expert opinions on these matters.
34This captures the percentage contribution to societal benefits of a risky project when
overall consumption increases by 1 percent.
35For instance, Gollier (2012: 191) shows that under the assumptions of Section IA, and
jointly normal project and consumption risks with correlation coefficient ρ, the risk premium
is given by pi(βj) = ηβjσ
2 where βj = ρσj/σ.
36In relation to climate change, see, e.g., Dietz et al. (2017), Daniel et al. (2015), and
Sandsmark and Vennemo (2007).
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V. Conclusion
We have presented evidence from a survey of over 200 experts on the de-
terminants of the long-term real social discount rate (SDR) for discounting
certainty-equivalent cash flows of public projects with intergenerational con-
sequences. The SDR is, perhaps, the single most important driver of any
cost-benefit analysis evaluating long-term public projects. We find that the
median (mean) recommended SDR of our experts is 2 percent (2.3 percent).
While there is considerable disagreement between respondents on point rec-
ommendations, which range from 0 to 10 percent, more than three-quarters
of those surveyed would find the median and modal SDR of 2 percent accept-
able for risk-free projects. More than 90 percent are comfortable with a SDR
somewhere in the interval of 1 percent to 3 percent.
A key innovation of our survey is that we not only elicit responses on
the appropriate and acceptable SDR itself, but also on individual discounting
determinants: recommendations on the rate of pure time preference and the
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, as well as predictions of long-term
per-capita consumption growth and the average real risk-free rate of interest.
This disentangled data allow us to shed some light on which approaches to so-
cial discounting experts use. Importantly, our disentangled data show that the
simple deterministic Ramsey Rule, which is still found in governmental guide-
lines on cost-benefit analysis across the world, cannot explain the responses of
the majority of our experts. This finding suggests that more complex models
for social discounting are required, a conclusion that is supported by the rich
body of qualitative responses we received. Many of our respondents provided
comments relating to a number of extensions and alternatives to the simple
Ramsey Rule. The issues raised included uncertainty, heterogeneity, relative
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prices of non-marketed goods, as well as entirely different (e.g. non-Utilitarian
or procedural, rather than consequential) approaches to societal evaluation.
Policy guidance on social discounting should consider these alternatives to
ensure efficient and equitable decisions on long-term public projects.
Further inspection of the data on individual discounting determinants yields
findings that go beyond their value as potential inputs to governmental dis-
counting guidelines. First, we find that the modal value of the pure rate of time
preference is zero. Yet, with a median (mean) of 0.5 percent (1.1 percent), our
results cannot confirm the IPCC’s (2014: 229) conclusion that there is “a broad
consensus for a zero or near-zero pure rate of time preference”. Second, our
data suggest that the IPCC should consider lower growth scenarios in future
assessments. Third the median and modal recommended elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption of unity provides some support for the frequently made
assumption of logarithmic utility. Lastly, we find that there exists consider-
able disagreement between experts on the relative importance of normative
and positive approaches to discounting. Most report that the SDR should
reflect both, highlighting that these previously accepted categories overly po-
larize more nuanced expert views. Engaging with both disagreement about
values and uncertainty over forecasts is therefore an essential task for inform-
ing decision-making on long-term public projects.
Overall, our findings lead us to the conclusion that the prominence of the
simple Ramsey Rule needs to be revisited as it provides an inadequate guide for
determining SDRs, and that much of current policy guidance concerning social
discounting and the evaluation of long-term public projects requires updating.
While not uncontentious, our survey points to a long-term global SDR for
certainty-equivalent cash flows of 2 percent. This risk-free SDR is lower than
recommended by many governments around the world and prominent experts
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(Nordhaus 2008, Weitzman 2001), yet closer to recent revealed evidence on
long-term discounting from the housing-market (Giglio et al. 2015).
Our results provide insights into the determinants of the risk-free SDR
that form key building-blocks in a range of approaches to evaluating societal
decision-making. For instance, our data on the rate of pure time preference
and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption may inform the cal-
ibration of the social welfare functions in integrated assessment models of
climate change. Yet, as the future is inherently uncertain, governments should
take into account risk and uncertainty when evaluating long-term projects.
Building on the results presented in this paper, decision-makers would there-
fore be well-advised to consider the components of the risk-adjusted SDR, or
how certainty-equivalents can be estimated, when evaluating long-term public
investments.
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Appendix
A. Non-Response Bias and Representativeness
We followed several standard procedures to test for the existence of non-
response bias. First, from December 2014 to April 2015 we contacted via
e-mail and telephone 60 randomly selected non-respondents. This allowed us
to obtain a further 38 responses, with 14 of these experts providing qualita-
tive data and 24 giving reasons for their initial non-responses.37 Second, our
sample includes quantitative responses from 11 of the 13 “blue ribbon” ex-
perts on social discounting from the Arrow et al. (2012) panel that advised
the US EPA.38 Third, we divide the sample between early and late responses
(Dalecki et al. 1993, Necker 2014), defined by the subsample of 58 experts
that directly responded to the first e-mail and those that answered a reminder
e-mail. We check for potential non-response bias by comparing mean and
median responses of each of these groups (see Table A.1). While there are
differences regarding some discounting determinants, we find that there are no
statistically significant differences in SDR values across different groups.
A further common measure for potential non-response bias is to consider
groups by gender and location (Necker 2014).39 We find that male experts se-
lected into responding to our survey relative to the non-response group (91 per-
cent versus 81 percent). The proportions of respondents and non-respondents
37Reasons include having insufficient time (11 times) as well as insufficient expertise (10
times), which may indicate self-selection of experts into responding to the survey.
38A twelfth panel member initially provided qualitative evidence only, but stated after
the survey was completed that he would “follow the view of the median panelist.”
39Personal characteristics were obtained from experts’ own web pages. We collected infor-
mation on continental location, gender, professorial title, and year of Ph.D. graduation as a
proxy for (academic) age. We identify 89 respondents from Europe, 80 from the Americas
and 14 from the Rest of the World. We have 167 male respondents, while only 16 women
gave quantitative answers to our questionnaire. Approximately half our sample are full
professors and the mean year of Ph.D. graduation is 1994.
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Table A.1: Comparison with Non-Respondents and Arrow et al. Experts
g δ η r Normative SDR SDRmin SDRmax
Results from the 185 quantitative responses
Mean 1.70 1.10 1.35 2.38 61.53 2.27 1.12 4.14
Median 1.60 0.50 1.00 2.00 70.00 2.00 1.00 3.50
N 181 180 173 176 182 181 182 183
Results from the 14 randomly selected previous non-respondent responses
Mean 1.63 1.46 1.23 1.96 71.36 2.02 1.01 3.09
Median 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.75 75.00 2.00 0.63 3.00
N 12 12 8 12 12 13 14 13
Results from 11 of the 13 Arrow et al. (2012) panel experts
Mean 1.80 0.60 1.51 2.66 57.27 2.62 1.30 4.00
Median 2.00 0.50 1.50 3.00 50.00 3.00 1.00 4.00
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Results from the 58 early responses
Mean 1.49 0.73 1.47 2.26 60.14 1.99 0.92 3.68
Median 1.50 0.38 1.50 2.00 50.00 2.00 0.75 3.00
N 58 58 56 58 58 58 58 58
Results from the 127 late responses
Mean 1.80 1.27 1.29 2.44 62.18 2.40 1.21 4.35
Median 1.80 0.90 1.00 2.00 70.00 2.00 1.00 4.00
N 123 122 117 118 124 123 124 125
are balanced in terms of characteristics such as being a full Professor (49 per-
cent versus 48 percent) and average year of Ph.D. completion (1993.6 versus
1993.7). Experts currently based in Europe selected into responding (49 per-
cent of respondents versus 32 percent of non-respondent). This may have led
to a slight underestimation of the mean SDR given a slight propensity of Eu-
ropeans to be more normative than non-Europeans.40 Overall, our findings do
not suggest substantial and systematic unidirectional non-response biases for
SDR recommendations.
40The 88 experts currently located in Europe had a mean SDR recommendation of 1.91
percent, compared to 2.60 percent for the 91 non-Europeans.
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B. Overview of Qualitative Responses
Table B.1: Overview of Qualitative Responses
Issue N Exemplary quote
Q1: Growth rate 14 I foresee a very bright economic future with a continued 2
percent growth rate for the coming century.
Q2: Pure time preference 10 I see no reason to treat generations not equally.
Q3: Elasticity of
marginal utility
12 The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is heteroge-
neous, and using a single value is a crude simplification.
Q4: Real risk-free interest
rate
8 There is no interest rate for 100 year horizon (to my knowl-
edge).
Q5: Normative vs. positive 16 The components of the SDR are overwhelmingly normative.
Declining discount rates
and time horizon
20 I am more comfortable with declining discount rates [...] due
both to declining time preference rates and to uncertainty
about future consumption growth.
Heterogeneity and aggre-
gation
19 Ideally, the input for our [social welfare function] would be a
utility function that allows for heterogeneous preferences.
Opportunity cost of funds 8 SDRs should reflect the social opportunity cost of funds.
Project risk 6 We would have to consider very carefully the risk structure
of the investment to get a correct discount rate.
Relative prices of
non-marketed goods
20 If future costs/benefits accrue e.g. to environmental ameni-
ties, I would argue for a very low discount rate, based on an
expectation of increasing relative prices for these goods.
Uncertainty 20 We need to admit that the current state of the world is full
of uncertainties. [Yet] most uncertainties are neglected, and
sometimes few remain when these are considered most im-
portant, [...] or easiest to accommodate.
Alternatives to discounting 15 Instead of imposing a [social welfare function] and calculate
the corresponding optimum, it is ‘better’ to depict a set of fea-
sible paths of consumption, production, temperature, income
distribution, etc. and let the policy maker make a choice.
Comments on the survey 14 The search for THE discount rate, if that is your project, is
deeply flawed.
Confidence intervals 8 I would also insist on providing confidence intervals.
Ramsey Rule 17 My discount rate is less than implied by the Ramsey rule
because I use the extended rule, incorporating uncertainty.
Role of experts 7 I really think economists have very little special expertise
in knowing the ‘right’ number. These parameters should be
chosen in an open, iterative way with an eye toward under-
standing the consequences of different choices.
Limited confidence 13 Please ignore my response to Q4: I don’t have the knowledge
to make a meaningful forecast.
Limited expertise 5 I am not a real expert on these issues.
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
— Not for publication —
A Comparison to Weitzman’s (2001) Survey
A natural reference comparison for our results is the seminal survey of
Weitzman (2001), who asked more than 2000 Ph.D.-level economists to report
a single appropriate “real discount rate” or “rate of interest” with which to
discount projects aimed at mitigating climate change. The key difference be-
tween the response data of Weitzman (2001) and our results is that we find a
substantially lower mean (median) SDR recommendation, with 2.27 percent (2
percent) compared to 3.96 percent (3 percent). Furthermore, we find a much
lower standard deviation of the SDR responses of 1.62 percent compared to
the 2.94 percent of Weitzman’s (2001) respondents, and the range of point
recommendations on the SDR is much more condensed (0 to 10 percent com-
pared to -3 percent to 27 percent).1 The modal recommended value for the
SDR of 2 percent, however, is the same in both surveys.
We can point to at least three potential explanations for these differences.
First, experts who have graduated from their Ph.D.s since Weitzman’s survey
was conducted generally recommend lower SDRs than those who have been in
the profession for longer. Second, the literature that has influenced this new
generation of academics — for example, on declining discount rates and the
arguments articulated in the Stern Review — may have led more established
1The standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the imputed SRRs (3.52%, -2%
and 26% respectively) are, by contrast, similar to the values reported in Weitzman (2001).
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scholars to reduce their SDR recommendations during their careers. Third,
Weitzman’s pool of potential respondents is a general economics audience,
while we select only those scholars who have published directly on discounting
and can be considered specialists in this sense.
B Further Detail on the Selection of Experts
Based on full-text analysis in the Google Scholar engine, we searched the
102 leading economics journals (according to the ranking of Combes and Lin-
nenmer 2010) plus the Review of Environmental Economics and Policy for
publications since the year 2000 including the terms ‘social discounting’, ‘so-
cial discount rate’ or ‘social discount factor’ (in March/April 2014). As a
result, we identified 778 potential experts. As not all pertinent contributions
to the field use the term ‘social discount rate’, but often ‘real discount rate’ or
simply ‘discount rate’, we further performed an EconLit search for the term
‘discount rate’ (in April 2014). To avoid picking up a large number of papers
that only mention ‘discount rate’ in passing somewhere in the paper, we limited
the scope to a within-abstract search. This search yielded an additional 241
potential experts. We thus identified a total of 1019 unique potential experts.
We then manually discarded – using a weak relevancy test – publications that
are clearly not of direct relevance for our study. The criteria used to judge
whether a publication is not relevant are listed below:
• If the search phrases do not appear in the article itself, but only in the
reference list.
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• If the publication is a book review or another non-original contribution.
• If a value for the SDR is simply applied in an analysis without reference
to the literature.
• If one of the phrases is mentioned but not elaborated on.
• If the publication relies on a discount rate that is clearly not relevant to
long-term social discounting by governmental bodies, such as discounting
of profits or university fees.
A publication is labeled irrelevant if it meets at least one of the listed criteria.
If at least one of the publications of a scholar is regarded to be relevant (i.e.
passes this weak relevancy test), he or she is considered to be an expert. As
a result of the above relevancy test, we exclude 365 scholars from the pool of
potential experts, thus being left with 654 potential experts. For 27 of these
scholars we could not obtain an e-mail address because, for example, they have
left academia or are deceased. Our final population of potential experts thus
contains 627 experts.2
2Although potential experts have published in leading economics journals, a small number
of them do not have a Ph.D. in economics but come from diverse fields, including law and
the natural sciences.
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C E-mail Text
This Appendix provides the text of the initial e-mail introducing experts
to the online survey.
Dear [Personal identifier],
We are targeting a select group of academics with expertise in social dis-
counting. The objective is to elicit recommendations on fundamental issues of
discounting to inform long-term public investment decision-making.
We would be most grateful if you could find the time to complete the very
short survey appended below.
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/discounting-survey
Your individual response will be held in the strictest confidence.
Many thanks for your time and cooperation,
Ben Groom (LSE), Moritz Drupp (Kiel, LSE),
Frikk Nesje (Oslo, LSE), Mark Freeman (Loughborough)
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D Further Checks of Non-Response Bias
We carried out a series of robustness checks to test for potential non-
response bias (see Johnson and Wislar (2012) and Necker (2014) for discussions
of different testing strategies).
In the main body of the paper, we first compare our 185 quantitative
responses with a random sample of 60 potential experts who had not replied by
November 2014. Second, we compare our 185 quantitative responses with the
sub-sample responses of the Resources for the Future (RFF) Arrow et al. (2012)
panel on intergenerational decision-making. Third, we consider differences
in observable characteristics – academic age, location and gender – among
respondents and non-respondents. A related check is to test for self-selection
of environmental economists into responding.3 Indeed, we observe that they do:
48% of respondents are environmental economists, while only 33% of the non-
respondents are environmental economists. Yet, we find that environmental
economists’ mean and median SDRs are not statistically signficantly different
(at the 10 percent level) to non-environmental economists.
Lastly, we consider differences between experts who responded to the initial
wave, and those who responded to a reminder. In Table 3 we report the results
of a comparison of those who had responded to the first survey and those who
had responded to a reminder to obtain a further indirect measure of potentially
biasing participation. At the 10 percent level of significance only the mean
3We regard an expert to be an environmental economist if the publication that led us
to select her or him as a potential expert is in one of: American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Ecological Economics, Energy Journal, Environmental and Resource Economics,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Land Economics, Resource and
Energy Economics, or Review of Environmental Economics and Policy.
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Table D.1: Alternative Comparison of Early and Late Responses
g δ η r Normative SDR SDRmin SDRmax
Split by time of response in SurveyMonkey
Results from the 88 early responses
Mean 1.63 0.93 1.44 2.42 61.72 2.18 1.07 3.89
Median 1.50 0.50 1.25 2.00 70.00 2.00 1.00 3.25
N 88 88 85 88 88 87 88 88
Results from the 88 late responses
Mean 1.81 1.26 1.27 2.38 61.00 2.34 1.17 4.38
Median 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 68.50 2.00 1.00 3.50
N 85 85 83 81 88 87 87 87
forecasted per-capita growth rate and recommended social rate of pure time
preference are different between the samples of early and late respondents. The
mean forecasted per-capita growth rate and recommended social rate of pure
time preference are higher for the sub-sample of respondents that required a
reminder. On the other hand, the median recommendation on the elasticity of
marginal utility is the only median response significantly different between the
subsamples, with the median of those responding immediately being higher. As
a robustness check, we also divided early and late respondents into equal sized
groups and found that the results were similar. The results of this additional
exercise are reported in Table D.1. While we find some effect for those requiring
a reminder versus those that responded right away, we do not find significant
differences in mean and median recommendations and forecasts when we split
the whole sample into equal halves and consider early and late respondents
based on this definition.
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